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JUST WAR-A LEGAL CONCEPT?

Arthur Nussbaum*

D

URING the century pr~ceding the First World War the topic of
"just war," frequently and intensely treated in earlier periods,
had almost disappeared from the writings on international relations.
Since the end of the war, however, the issue has been revived by writers
within and without the legal profession. The present article purports,
principally by an inquiry into its historical background,1 to determine its
legal relevance.
GREEK AND RoMAN CoNCEPTIONs

The contrast between legal and nonlegal notions on just war appears as early as the ancient Greek and Roman ideas on the subject.
Writers have assembled a number of ancient Greek utterances on just
war,2 the most famous being a passage in Aristotle's Politics. 8 '.fhere
the philosopher declares warfare a natural way of acquisition and
likens to a hunt the war against those who, though destined by nature
to be governed, will not .submit ( to wit, the war against barbarians) ;
such a war is "by nature just." Apparently this is a political judgment
with no definite, and certainly with no legal, theory behind it. The
same may be said of the statements of some other famous Greeks who
occasionally identified the just war with the successful war.4

*

Visiting Research Professor ·of Public Law, Columbia University; Dr. Juris,
University of Berlin. Formerly Professor at Berlin University, Faculty of Law; lecturer
at Academie de Droit International, Hague. Author; MoNEY IN LAw (1939), PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943), and of other books as well as of numerous articles in European and American periodicals.-Ed.
1 Valuable historical studies on the subject matter have been published by JosEPH
SALviou, LE CoNcEPT DE LA GuERRE JusTE D'APRES LES EcRIVAINs ANTERIEURES
A GROTIUS, transl. Hervo, (1918), hereafter referred to as LE CoNCEPT DA LA GUERRE
JusTE; and by Joachim von Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in
International Law," 33 AM. J. INT. L. 665 (1939).
2
FITZGERALD, PEACE AND WAR IN ANTIQUITY, (1931); SALVIOLI, LE CONCEPT
DE LA GUERRE JvsTE IO (1918); von Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the
Just War," 33 AM. J. INT. L. 665 (1939).
18 ARISTOTLE, PoLITICS I, 3, §8; transl. in FITZGERALD, PEACE AND WAR IN ANTIQUITY 29 (1931). The translation is slightly altered.
4
Cf. SALVIOLI, LE CoNCEPT DE LA GUERRE JusTE I I (1918); Kosters, "Le 'Droit
des Gens chez St. Augustin," 60 REv. DE DR. INT. 634 at 636 (1933). 2 PHILLIPSON,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CusToM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND RoME 179 (19u),
hereafter referred to as THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GREECE AND RoME, asserts that
the Greeks undertook no war without alleging a valid and sufficient justification, but
his vague statement is entirely undocumented.
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Conversely, there appears with the Romans a definite legal theory
of just war' which can be traced back to the era of the kings. To the
Romans, a war was just only if it was pr.eceded by a solemn action taken
by the collegium fetialium, a corporation of special priests, the fetiales. 5
It was for them to decide whether a foreign nation had violated its
duty toward the Romans. The elaborate proceeding did not provide
for the -active co-operation of the foreign nation, but whenever the
foreign nation was deemed guilty of a violation of its duties, then the
delegate of the fetiales under an oath, by the Roman gods, upon the
justice of his assertion would demand satisfaction of the foreign nation.
The oath included a self-execration condemning the whole Roman
people should the delegate's assertion be wrong. In case the foreign
nation requested time for deliberation, thirty or thirty-three days
would be granted. If the period terminated without result, the f etiales
would certify to the senate the presence of a just cause of war; the ultimate political decision was left with the senate and ~he people. True,
this proceeding did not handicap the Romans in their wars of conquest,
- but at' least from the viewpoint of "morale" it was_ of incomparable
value to them because of the apparent fairness of the trial; particularly,
it gave the people the certitude that the god,s would side with them.
The bellum justum, under these conditions, was at the same time
bellum pium. 0 Thus, the Roman legal genius succeeded in making
jural this religious and utterly vague concept. Using modern terminology, the prerequisite of the certification by the collegium f etiale
amounted to a rule of the unwritten ancient Roman constitution: a war
was to be started only with the consent of the pri_estly collegium.
This explains why, in the language of the ancient Romans, the concept of justum .bellum bore a definite technic~l meaning. Cicero had it
in mind in a famous passage of his tract De Officiis,1 but, in a more
11 Earlier discussions on the jus fetiale have been superseded by I PHILLIP~ON,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GREECE AND ROME 327 (1911) and by Samter, 6
PAULY-WISSOWA's REALENCYCLOPAEDIE DES KLASSISCHEN ALTERTUMS "Fetiales"
(1909). Cf. also SALVIOLI, LE CoNCEPT DE LA GUERRE JuSTE 13 (1918); Tenney
Frank, "The Import of the Fetial Institution," 7 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 335 (1912)
and A. REUSS, Drn VoLKERRECHTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER RoMISCHEN ,AUSSENPOLITIK 18 ff. (1933).
6
2 PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW oF GREECE AND RoME 180 (1911).
7 CICERO, DE OFFICIIS I, I 1 § 36; "Nullum bell um esse justum nisi quod aut rebus
repetitis geratur aut denunciatum ante sit et interdictum." The terms used are all
technical: "rebus repetitis" means any demand for satisfaction, corporeal or other. See
1 PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw oF GREECE AND RoME 327 (1911) and
Samte-r, 6 PAULY-WISSOWA's REALENCYCLOPAEDIE DES KLASSISCHEN ALTERTUM
"Fetiales" ( 1909). Nevertheless, the passage-was cited in support of much later doc-
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philosophical vein he also characterized war as an ultimate expedient
and declared the goal of war to be the unperturbed life in peace.8
EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES

In imperial Roman times, the collegium fetiale as well as the inherited concept of just war vanished together with many political
institutions and notions of the past. Christianity gave rise to a new
ideology. Under the pagan emperors, Tertullian and other Church
Fathers, relying on certain scriptural passages, objected to Christian
participation in war and military service, and this remained the preponderant Christian doctrine long after Constantine the Great's conversion to Christianity (337). It was St. Augustine (354-430) who,
coalescing Roman and Christian tradition, opened a middle road by
firmly approving Christian participation in war and the military profession, but at the same time requiring that war be just.9 War may be
justly waged, he explained, for the avenging of injuries sufferedwhen one must vanquish by armed forces a city or a nation which is
unwilling to punish a bad action of its citizens, or which refuses to restore what it has unjustly taken; yet never ought a war to be begun
out of a craving for power or revenge. Like Cicero, St. Augustine
insisted that war should only serve as a means for obtaining a tranquil
peace. An important feature of St. Augustine's doctrine consists in not
directly linking the outcome of the war to the justness of its cause.
According to him, the outcome of the war may be a chastisement or a
purification willed for higher purposes by Divine Providence.
Augustine's tenets have remained the basis of the Catholic teaching
on peace and war up to the present time.10 Principally they are religiophilosophical. In no way did they lay down legal rules. Nevertheless,
they were bound to have repercussions in the legal area. The centuries
trine, e.g., by the archbishop Isidor of Seville (560-636); cf. REGOUT, S. J., LA
DocTRINE DE GuERRE JuSTE DE ST. AUGUSTIN A Nos JouRs 45 n.2 (1934), hereafter referred to as LA DoCTRINE DE GUERRE JUSTE.
8 C1cERo, DE 0FFICIIS I, 23, § 80. Here the term "justum bellum" does not
appear.
9
His main propositions in point are found in 33 MIGNE, PATROLOGIA LATINA 531,
855; 856 (1865); 34 id. 781; 41 id, 634,637,640,643; 42 id. 441. For discussions
of St. Augustine's theory of just war see Kosters, "Le Droit des Gens chez St. Augustin," 60 REv. DE DR. INT. 634 (1933); SALVIOLI, LE CoNCEPT DE LA GUERRE
JuSTE 27 (1918); REGOUT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JusTE 39-44 (1934). See
also DE LA BRIERE, LE DROIT DE JUSTE GUERRE 18-19 (1938); CoMBEs, LA DocTRINE PoLITIQUE DE ST. AUGUSTIN 255 (1927).
10
The pacifist trends, however, did not entirely vanish in the Church, see Nys,
0RIGINES DU DR01T INTERNATIONAL 48 [Wycliffe], 388 (Irenists] (1894).
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following the collapse of the Roman Empire were unfavorable to the
development of legal theory, but legal implications of the Augustinian
conception were brought to light in the earliest part of the Corpus
Juris Canonici, the Decretum Gratiani (II50), a work of the Benedictine monk, Gratian. In the second chapter of the Decretum, which is
devoted to a discussion of cases ( causae), Causa XXIII1 1 deals with a
situation where bishops, vested with temporal power by the emperor,
had made war against certain heretic bishops and their followers, at
the behest of the Apostolic See. Gratian declares this warfare just;
among other points, he deems the seizure by the victor of the heretics'
property lawful. His main authorities are St. Augustine and Isidore of
Sevilla (560-636) who leans rather closely on the ancient Roman
formulas.12 Gratian's discourse moves largely in theological terms, but
he clearly aims at setting forth rules in fora externo, which is also indicated by the entire character of the Corpus Juris Canonici. More
specifically, the decisions arrived at in Causa XXIII lay down rules of
ecclesiastical administrative law which lack neither workability nor enforceability." Workability. was secured by the power of the superior
ecclesiastical authority to determine whether or not the intended war
was just; and enforceability resulted from the smallness of the principalities concerned. ( Causa XXIII illustrates at the same time the fact
that the concept of war was then not confined to contests between independent nations.)
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, some other theologians or canonists 13 participated, along traditional lines, in the discussion of just war.14 Thomas Aquinas (r.225-1274) then epitomized
and systematized the Christian doctrine on the subject, when, in his
Summa Theologiae, he treated the three "theological virtues" which
are faith, hope, and charity; war appears in the chapter on charity,15
11

lts more important parts have been translated into French by VANDERPOL, LA
DocTRINE ScHoLASTIQUE DU DRorT D~ GUERRE 290-300 ( 1919), hereafter referred
to as LA DocTRINE ScHOLASTIQUE. See also REGOUT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE
JUSTE 61-66" ( 1934) •
c
12
He repeats literally Cicero's formula; REGOUT, LA. DocTRINE DE GUERRE
JusTE 45, n. 2 (1934).
·is Id. 67-93.
14 Remarkably, the concept of just war exhibited a certain significance in feudal
law which authorized· the vassal to deny offensive assistance to his seignior in an evidently unjust war; NYs, ORIGINES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 175 (1894), giving
references.
15
AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGIAE, Quaestio XL, de Bello, has been translated into
French by VANDERPOL, LA DocTRINE ScHoLASTIQUE 308 et seq. (1919). For a discussion of Aquinas' tenets see REcouT, LA DocTRINE ,DE GuERRE JusTE 79-93
_

1 943}

JusTWAR

457

war being an action opposed to charity. To the question, "whether it is
always a sin to wage a war," he answers in the negative, provided ( l)
that the prince has power thereof ( that there is "auctoritas principis'');
( 2) that there is a justa causa, to wit, that the adverse party deserves
to be fought against because of some guilt of his own (propter aliquam
culpam); and (3) that the belligerents are possessed of a recta intentio,
namely, the intention to promote the good or to avoid the evil. These
three prerequisites are not of equal weight, however. The justa causa
is definitely the core of the Thomist, and generally of the scholastic,
doctrine on just war, while the recta intentio, a vague notion, is generally understood not to influence the legitimacy of war.16 According
to modern conceptions which limit war to contests among nations,
auctoritas principis would appear a prerequisite of "war" rather than of
just war, but this was different in Aquinas' as well as in Gratian's times
with their bloody feuds which the church tried to control and to suppress. Aquinas' theological and moralist approach also implies that
auctoritas principis must not be taken in a legalistic sense.17
Aquinas' treatment of the subject is brief and does not add to the
substance of the doctrine of St. Augustine whose authgrity he again and
again invoked. He achieved progress, however, by elaborating a solid
logical framework which was faithfully adopted by later theologians.
The Thomist formula also exerted a certain influence in the legal area
inasmuch as Bartolus (1314-1357), the famous commentator of the
Corpus Juris Civilis, in his tract on reprisals,18 resorted to the prerequisites of auctoritas principis and justa causa. Reprisals at that time were
preponderantly a private law matter, the ,main instance being that on
the default of a foreign debtor his co-citizens or their property would
be seized by the creditor under a grant by the local authorities.19 The
matter was ordinarily regulated by statutory enactments and by treaties,
(1934); BEAUFORT {of the Franciscan Order), LA GUERRE CoMME INSTRUMENT DE
SEcouRs ou DE PuNITION 56-63 (1933). See also SCHILLING, DAs VoLKERRECHT
NACH THOMAS VON AQUIN 39 et seq. (1919). ·
16
See REGOUT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JusTE 81 (1934).
17
He was, therefore, not concerned with the academic problem discussed by the
Commentators (infra at note 21) whether under the law the emperor and the pope
had exclusive authority to wage a war.
18
BARTOLUS, TRACTATUS REPRAESALIARUM {oPERA QUAE EXTANT OMNIA, Venice
ed. 1595, vol. X, p. 119) I, 4. "In foro interno" however, Bartolus adopts the integral
Thomist doctrine including the "intentio recta" requirement; id. 1, 3.
19
A regular prerequisite of the grant for reprisals was "denial of justice" by the
foreign authorities. See Spiegel, "Origin and Development of Denial of Justice;' 32
AM. J. INT. L. 63 at 69 (1938).
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and constituted, therefore, an excellent object of juridical inquiry.20
Bartolus and other "commentators," in regarding war, did not occupy
themselves with the Thomist doctrine; they wrangled on the theory,
especially advocated by Baldus (1327-1400), that only the emperor
and the pope had authority to wage a war, and that other belligerent
princes should be treated simply as brigands not entitled to the benefits of the law with respect to 'prisoners of war, booty, etc.21
VITORlA AND.SUAREZ

As indicated above, the issue of just war was never abandoned by
the theologians 22 and was resumed in a novel and impressive fashion oy
the Spanish Dominican, Francisco de Vitoria, Professor of Theology in
the University of Salamanca, in his lectures of i538 and 1539, "On the
Indians lately discovered" and "On the War made by the Spaniards
on the Barbarians." 23 The Dofi!inican Order had early undertaken the
evangelization of the American aborigines. The great Dominican,
Bartholemew de las Casas, "father of the Indians," and "the noblest
man who ever landed in the western world," 24 had consumed himself
in heroic e:fforts to protect the Indians against the outrageous cruelties
of the Spanish conquerors. Vitoria was concerned with a theoretical
problem, namely, to what extent the war of the Spaniards against the
Indians was a "just war," but he approached the subject much in Las
20

In addition to BARTOLus, TRACTATUS REPRESALIORUM, cf. ERICH ScHuMANN, DIE REPRESSALIE 4 et seq. (1927) and DEL VECCHIO and CASANOVA, LE RAPPRESAGLIE NE1 CoMMUNI MEDIEVALI (1894).
2i See SALVIOLI, LE CONCEPT DEL~ GUERRE JUSTE 37'etseq., 60 et seq. (1918).
22
•
See REGOUT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JusTE 102 (1934).
•
28
VITORIA, DE INms ET DE JuRE BELLI RELECTIONES (1538), transl. in CLASS;cs
oF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1917). See furthermore, ScoTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1932); ScoTT, THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1934); ALBERTINI, L'OEUVRE DE FRANCISCO DE VITORIA ET LA DOCTRINE
CANONIQUE DU DROIT DE LA GUERRE (1903); Barthelemy, "Fran~ois de Vitoria,"
LES FoNDATEURS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, Pillet ed., (1904); VANDERPOL, LA
DocTRINE ScHoLASTIQUE 243-244 (1919) (French translation of DE JuRE BELLI);
Trelles, "Francisco de Vitoria et !'Ecole Modeme du Droit International," I 7 RECUEIL DES CouRs II3 (1927); REGouT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JusTE 152-185
(1934); AssocIATION INTERNATIONALE VITORIA-SUAREZ, VITORIA ET SUAREZ (1939)
(Latin texts with French translation); Von der Heydte, "Franciscus de Vitoria und sein
Volkerrecht," 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR 0FFENTLICHES RECHT 237 at 264 (1933);
Hentschel, "Franciscus de Vitoria und seine Stellung im Obergang vom mittelalterlichen zum· neuzeitlichen Volkerrecht," 17 id. 319 (1937). Biographical: GETINo,
(of the Dominican Order) EL MAESTRO FRAY FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2nd ed., (1930).
, 24 ln the words of his biographer, FRANCIS AUGUSTUS MAcNuTT, BARTHOLOMEW
DE LAS CAsr.s, preface, (1909). See also MARCEL BRION, BARTHOLEME DE LAS CASAS,
PERE DES INDIENS ( 192 7).
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Casas' spirit.25 While he ultimately vindicated the Spanish conquestand it may be said that the Spaniards brought to the American aborigines a higher civilization-he firmly denounced, on the ground of
Christian charity, the abuses committed by the conquerors, and he
dauntlessly refuted the exc~sive claims raised by the emperor-then
Charles V- and by the pope, or by their advocates, in respect to the
domination of the Americas. 26 A good Spaniard, Vitoria denied that
the emperor was still in any sense the temporal ruler of the world;
countries such as Spain or France he considered as entirely independent
in law as they were in fact. By applying a similar view to the communities of the Indian aborigines, he made it possible to use in his examination of the Spanish-Indian relations the doctrine of just war as developed by Thomas Aquinas. While on the whole following the
method and precepts of his master, who was also a Dominican, Vitoria
raised a new problem of great importance, to wit, whether a war can
be just on both sides. Apparently he felt that the cause of the Indians,
who after all acted in self-defense, should not be denied the recognition
of justness altogether. But here Vitoria encountered doctrinal difficulties. He looked upon the victorious prince as a judge who had to mete
out appropriate punishment to the defeated. 27
25
In an important controversy, Vitoria rendered an opinion in favor of Las Casas'
tenets. See GETINo, EL MAESTRO FRAY FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2nd ed., I 68 et seq.
(1930); Introduction by Nys to Vitoria's DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES
in CLAsstcs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1917). The bearing of Las Casas' mission on
Vitoria's writings is briefly examined by BRION, BARTHOLEME DE LAS CASAS, PERE DES
INDIENS, 302 et seq. (1927).
26
Vitoria has been e~phatically called a "liberal." ScoTT, SPANISH ORIGIN oF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 275 (1932). Assuming the term could fit a Dominican of the
sixteenth century, it is hardly applicable to Vitoria. When in 1527 a committee (junta)
of the Holy Inquisition examined the works of Erasmus of Rotterdam, Vitoria declared
twenty-one tenets of Erasmus as heretic, though it seems that the majority of the
committee, including high dignitaries of the church, were in favor of Erasmus. GETINO,
EL MAESTRO FRAY FRANCISCO DE VtTORtA, 2nd ed., 69 (1930); Hentschel, "Franciscus
de Vitoria und seine Stellung im Ubergang vom mittelalterlichen zum neuzeitlichen
Volkerrecht," 17 ZEtTSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLtCHEs RECHT 319 at 328 (1937); Introduction by Nys to Vitoria's DE INDts ET DE JuRE BELLI RELECTIONES in CLASSICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1917). Regarding the layman's right to form an independent judgment on questions of conscience, Vitoria took a narrower view than did
Carinal Cajetan, master-general of the Dominican order, infra p. 461. And it
must not be overlooked that the Dominicans were the dominant figures of the Holy
Inquisition. See, touching the confiscation of heretic property, VITORIA, DE INDIS I,
Nos. 8-13 (1538), transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 123-124 (1917). Cf.
also WEGNER, GESCHICHTE DES VoLKERRECHTS 142, n. II (1936).
27
VtTORtA, DE INDIS III, No. 8; DE JuRE BELLI, Nos. 1'7 and 56 ( I 538), transl.
in CLASStcs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 154, 171, 185 (1917).
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This "judicial" theory of just war 28 is certainly beneficial inasmuch
as it tends to counteract excessive exploitation of victory. But it makes
the victorious prince, so to speak, the tool of the divine plan which is
designed to establish justice through war. Evidently, under this theory
a war cannot be just on both sides. Also, as will be seen, Vitoria held
that in case of doubt it is exclusively for the church to determine the
justness or unjustness of a war, a determination which, of necessity,
can be in favor of one side only. Hence, ·on principle Vitoria held that
war cannot be just on both sides, but he explained that demonstrable
or invincible ignorance-he used either term-excuses the unrighteous
party, and that in this particular sense the war may be "just" on both
sides.29 Within certain limits Vitoria was willing to concede to the
Indians the exception of excusable ignorance. His.objective was laudable, indeed, but one can hardly agree with-the obliteration of the difference between the objective criterion of justness and the subjective
criterion of good faith.
Now in theology the distinction may be less important than in law,
but this very reflection leads to a critical point. Vitoria presented his
doctrine as definitely nonlegal. Though he not infrequently referred
to the law of nature and to the law of nations (jus gentium), he did so
from the angle and in the light of moral theology which did not conceive these notions as juridicial ones. While he sometimes cited the
Corpus Juris Canonici or the Corpus Juris Civilis, still the Scriptures,
St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and numerous other religious or theological sources form the bulk of his documentation. One must -admit
that the borderline between legal science and moral theology was in a
state of flux at that time, but in the case of Vitoria's tracts little doubt
is left as to their character, for Vitoria emphasized that his subject matter because it "concerns the forum of conscience,'' was not for ]urists,
or at any rate, not for jurists only.so· Moreover, he asserted that a layman may not solve his doubts in reliance on his own insight; the layman has to consult and to obey his spiritual adviser. Vitoria even insisted that a doubtful action, war or any· other, is not justified by its
inherent lawfulness; what matters is the advice of the priest. In this
respect Vitoria objects to the more liberal view of his late master28
Seeds of the doctrine may be found in earlier scholastic writings (not in Thomas
Aquinas); REGOUT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JusTE 65, n. 1, 73 (1934).
29
VITORIA, DE JuRE BELLI, No. 32; DE lNms III, No. 6 (1538), transl. in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 154 (1917).
so VITORIA, DE INDIS I, No. 3, paragraph 2; cf. also Introduction, paragraphs 3-7
(1538), f!ansl. in CLASSICS 119, 56 et seq.
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general, the famous Cardinal Cajetan (Thomas de Vio, d. 1534).81
Basically, however, Vitoria remained within the orbit of Dominican
tradition also in so far as another master-general of the Dominican
order, Raymond of Pennafort (d. 1275), had discussed the doctrine of
just war in his Summary of Penance (Summa de Penitentiae),82 (12341244), that is, as a matter concerning the forum conscientiae.
No doubt, Vitoria erected an imposing doctrinal edifice. The
formidable power of the church, with her dreaded punishments on
earth and in the other world, stood to deter the waging of an unjust
war. Here the "sanctions," so sadly missed in the law of nations, were
present. Nor was there with Vitoria's system any difficulty in dealing
with a notion as vague as "just war"-the church, in each particular
case, would render the decision through her priest. And all this was
not the phantasmagoria of an infatuated· ecclesiastic. There is at least
one recorded instance where Spanish authorities, before beginning a
war, consulted the clergy on the question of its justness.88 Vitoria himself served occasionally as advisor to Charles V. 84 He thus drew a picture which was not only in harmony with the doctrine of the church,
but had some foundation in actual Spanish state practice. All considered, his theory of just war could at his time well be considered as
workable.
Among Vitoria's successors in the field, none is more notable than
the Spanish Jesuit, Francesco Suarez (1548-1617),85 the "last of the
scholastics." He developed a full system of the theory of just war in
the chapter on charity in his posthumoul, work De Triplici Virtute
Theologica. 86 This systematization, which follows Thomas Aquinas'
81

VITORIA, DE INms I, Introduction, last paragraph (1538), transl. in CLASSICS

JOO.
182
REGOUT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JusTE 67 (1934); NYs, ORIGINES nu
DROIT INTERNATIONAL IOI (1894).
88
W. S. M. KNIGHT, THE LIFE AND WoRKS oF Huco GROTIUS 203 (1925), re,garding the Spanish war against the Zambeles.
84
Introduction by Nys to VITORIA'S DE lNDIS ET DE JuRE RELEcTIONES IN
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1917).
85
J. B. ScoTT, THE CATHOLIC CoNCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 127
(1934); also published as "Francisco Suarez: His Philosophy of Law and of Sanctions,"
22 GEo. L. J. 405 (1934); Sherwood, "Francisco Suarez," 12 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
GROTIUS SOCIETY 19 (1927); Rolland, "Suarez," FoNDATEURS DU :E>ROIT INTERNA- TIONAI, 95 (1904); Trelles, "Francisco Suarez," 43 REcUEIL DES CouRs 387 (1933);
and the excellent dissertation of H. RoMMEN (apparently a Catholic theologian) DIE
STAATSLEHRE DES FRANZ SUAREZ 270 ff. (1926). Biographical: FICHTER, S.J., MAN
OF SPAIN: FRANCIS SUAREZ (1940); outstanding, I & 2 DE ScoRAILLE, S.J., FRANCOIS
SUAREZ (1913).
86
SuAREZ, OPERA OMNIA XII (1856-1861). This work i~ in twenty-eight vol-
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example, suggests a theological approach, and there are in Suarez' reasoning and documentation numerous theological elements. Nevertheless, his disquisition presents a different picture from Vitoria's. It is
conducted in fora externo and for the most part in legal terms. Its
juridical flavor is enhanced by a highly conceptualistic and detached·
treatment, such as is more common with jurists than with theologians.87
Suarez' discourse on just war is focused on the "judicial" theory.
He ascribes to the prince who wages a just war, a real "jurisdiction,"
pertaining to "vindicative justice"; the belligerent action of the prince
is likened to the decree of a law court.38 The obvious objection that one
man cannot be at the same time both plaintiff and judge is answered,
not very convincingly, by the observation that war, as an act of vindicative justice, is indispensable to mankind and that no better method
has been founq. 39 Under so strict a "judicial" theory of war, the admission that a war may be Just on both sides is wholly unacceptable, and,
in.fact, is condemned by Suarez as "entirely absurd." Vitoria's "ignorance" exception is merely touched upon by Suarez in a manner which
makes it doubtful whether he approves it at all. 40 Instead, he qualifies
his tenet on the ground of prqbabilism: regarding the justness of war,
the prince ought to follow the "more probable" opinion.41 Another
aspect of Suarez' discourse is more intriguing. What if the righteous is
defeated in.war by the unrighteous? Since Suarez, unlike Vitoria, treats
the topic of war in a systematic fashion, one would expect a direct
answer to this question. But there is no such answer. Suarez seems to
indicate that the unrighteo¥s victor has to restore the spoils.42 This
·would conform with the views of medieval theologians,4 3 but in Suarez'
umes. The chapter on war was translated into French by VANDERPOL, LA DocTRINE
Sc:HOLASTIQUE 360 ff. (1919) and carefully analyzed by RoMMEN, DIE STAATSLEHRE
DES FRANZ SUAREZ 293 ff. (1926).
87
REcouT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JuSTE 201 (1934), comparing Vitoria's
and Suarez' work, calls the latter "plus juridique, plus dogmatique/'
38
SUAREZ, DE BELLO II, 1, (1621); id. c.' 4, 5, transl. in VANDERPOL, LA
DocTRINE ScHoLASTIQUE 367, 380 and passim (1919).
39
Id. IV, 7 (1621) transl. in VANDERPOL 339.
40
Id. IV, 1, 4, transl. in VANDERPOL 333.
41 Id. VI, 2, transl. in VANDERPOL 352.
According to Regout, supra n. 7, at ~22, the term "probabilism,, can be applied here only in a "very improper sense.» The type of probabilism involved may be
less objectionable than other types, but probabilism it is. See also Trelles, "Francisco
Suarez,» 43 REcUEIL DES CouRs 387 at 502 (1933).
42 SUAREZ, DE BEI;LO VII, 22 (1621), transl. in VANDERPOL, LA DoCTRJNE
ScHOLASTlQUE 3.84 (1919).
48 Cf. VANDERPOL, LA DocTRINE ScHOLASTIQUE. 155 (1919); NYS, LES 0RIGINES
DU DROIT lNTERNATI<?NAL 174 (1894), VITORIA, DE BELLO, n. 17 (1538).
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times the solution was plainly unworkable since wars had become more
and more contests between nations. The judicial theory seems also to be
behind Suarez' ideas on arbitration. On purely religious grounds he
claims for the pope general arbitral power over Christian princes, but
his attitude toward secular arbitration is cautious.44 While he recommends arbitration "in case no injustice is to be feared," he weakens this
half-hearted remark by the further statement that for the most part
each sovereign suspects the good faith of foreign judges. Generally,
therefore, he deems it sufficient for the prince to consult "wise and
trained men." If they find the right of the prince evident, such finding,
strangely, is taken by Suarez as a quasi-judicial proceeding upon which
the prince, being himself the judge, need no longer apply to others for
their decision. 45 On the contrary, the prince has now "jurisdiction" to
enforce his right; "one does not see why he should be bound to engage
in arbitration by another person."
Regarding the sanctions which secure the fulfillment of the commands of justice as recognized by the church Suarez expounds his views
in his famous tract written against James I of England, "Defensio
Fidei Adversus Anglicanae Sectae Errores'' (1613). 46 There Suarez
claims for the pope power to inflict upon Christian princes, Catholic or
Protestant, excommunication and temporal punishment. If necessary,
the supreme pontiff may depose kings and release their subjects from
the duty of obedience, and may authorize armed resistance-the prince
may even be slain upon a sentence passed against him.
Thus, the Suarezian, just as the Vitorian, body of rules is theoretically self-executory. In Suarez' times, however, Protestantism was
politically so firmly entrenched that his theory of universal papal supremacy and power of punishment fell strikingly short of reality. In
fact, Suarez was not much interested in reality; he was bent on develop4
¼ SUAREZ, DE BELLO IV, 5, 6 (1621), transl. in VANDERPOL, LA DocTRINE
ScHoLASTIQUE Nos. 355, 356 (1919). Philip II, with whom Suarez was in highest
favor, had been criticized by Gentili in DE JuRE BELLI I, c. 3, p. 25 (1588), transl.
in CLASSICS oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (1933), for not having submitted his claims
upon Portugal to arbitration. Though Suarez did not cite Gentili, a Protestant, his
remarks may be aimed at refuting the latter.
45
A sounder view had been taken more than half a century earlier by Pierino
Belli when he said that rulers often have evil advisers, ecclesiastical as well as lay, who
either to curry favor or through fear, frame all their speeches to suit them, and manufacture and seek out justifications for their party so that it may appear that their cause
is righteous. DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO X, 2, 22; translated in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1936). Suarez' tenets were objected to by his famous rival Vasques,
S. J. (1551-1604), cf. REcouT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JusTE 231 (1934).
46
Especially in ch. 3 and 6; SUAREZ, OPERA OMNIA XXIV.
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ing with an extreme dialectic power, the consequences from the given
-dogmatic premises. On the doctrine of just war, it is believed, his discourse does not constitute progress beyond Vitoria's discreet and deeply_
humane tractate, and may rather be taken as illustrative of the difficulties inherent in any conceptualistic treatment of the subject.
GROTIUS AND RACHEL

Nevertheless, the teachings of the scholastics exerted a considerable
influence upon later writers, and upon none more than the greatest
among them, Grotius. To him, as to the scholastics, the problem of just
war was central in his inquiry into the rules of international relations.
It determined the division of his De Jure Belli ac Pacis. While the
first book of the great work expounds the concepts of law and war in
general, the second is concerned with the various causes-justifiable or
not-of war; the thirq book deals with justness in the conduct of war.
The second book, by far the most voluminous, covers, it is true, the
causes of civil actions also, but the Grotian assimilation of these causes
with the causes of war only suggests the influence of the judicial theory
of the scholastics. Grotius' most detailed application of the law of
-nature to civil actions was a novelty, but the notion of the law of nature
as such was perfectly familiar to the scholastics. The latter were, however, less interested in its private law aspects; in fact, the Grotian elaboration of a natural law of contracts, of partnerships, insurance, and
other purely civil law matters is a kind of foreign substance within the
study of the "Law of War and Peace." The possibility of a war just on
both sides was denied by Grotius, who followed Vitoria on this score.
He ventured, however, an attempt at reconciling inherited theory with
the exigencies of international practice. According to Grotius, wars declared by public authority, regardless of the justness of their causes,
confer upon the parties permission to harm the enemy; in this sense,
he pointed out, the war may be "just" on both sides.47 This amounts
practically almost to ejecting the justa causa from international law.48
Yet Grotius' significant departure from tradition is not easy to perceive.
His discussion remains dominated by the old moralist conceptions;
47

GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PAcis (1625), transl. in CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1925). The immense bibliography on Gro~ius is listed by J. TER
MEULEN, CoNcISE BIBLIOGRAPHY ON HuGo GROTIUS (1925) and in GROTIANA, ed. by
Vereenigung voor de Uitgave of Grotius, 6 vols. (1928-1936).
48
GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI Ac PAc1s I, c. 3, §§ 8, 6 (1625); id. II, c. 1, §§ 1,
3; id. II, c. 17, § 19; id. II, c. 23, § 3; id. III, c. 4, §§ 3 and 4, transl. in CLASSICS OF
lNTERNATlONAL LAW 105, 170,435, 565, 643-644 (1925).
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ostensibly, merely another alternative meaning is imparted to the term
justum bellum. Again, the dialectic proceeding is in the scholastic
manner.
There are between scholasticism and Grotius' works many other
ties 49 which it is not necessary to dwell on for the purpose of the present
study 50 ; rather it is apposite to object to a recent tendency to overrate
his dependency upon them. The very fact of Grotius' Protestantism
carried with it a new approach to the subject matter. To Grotius, the
individual conscience is the touchstone of justness rather than the
judgment of the priest or the canons of the church. And he distinguishes himself even from contemporaneous and later Protestant writers in that his religious views are definitely nonsectarian. Grotius was
deeply devoted to the ideal of a reunion of the Christian churches.
There is in his work no aggressiveness against Catholicism; the De Jure
Belli ac Pacis, written in a Catholic country, France, and dedicated to
its king, seems to be prepared with a view to making its tenets acceptable to Catholics. 51 And, at variance with the scholastics, he does not
discriminate against the Saracens or other infidels.52
In addition to the all-embracing humaneness of his religious apGrotius states as the consequence of waging an unjust war that the guilty cannot
reach the kingdom of heaven without repentence. Id. III, c. IO, § 3, transl. in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 718-719 (1925). Regarding neutrals Grotius maintained a certain relevance of the just-war doctrine, id. III, c. l 7 § 3 ( l 62 5), transl. in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, p. 786 (1925). This: theory, explicable by the
atmosphere of the religious wars, has met with very little assent.
49
A few are indicated by REGOUT, LA DocTRINE DE GUERRE JusTE 274 et seq.

(1934).
60
Vollenhoven, "Grotius and Geneva" in 6 BrnLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 5(1926) asserts that Grotius differed from the scholastics in that he thought of war primarily as a
means of punishment. This tenet has been refuted by BEAUFORT ( of the Franciscan
Order) in LA GUERRE CoMME INSTRUMENT DE SEcOURS ou DE PuNITION 156 ff.

(1933).

51
For reasons not divulged, the book was on the Index from 1626 to 1896 in an
attenuated form, "unde corrigatur," but from the beginning it was held in great esteem
by learned Catholics, even of high ecclesiastical rank. See e.g., KNIGHT, THE LIFE
AND WoRKS OF HuGo GROTIUS 223 (1925). Recent Catholic theologian writers pay
high tribute to Grotius.
52
See e.g., VITORIA, DE JuRE BELLI No. 48 (1538); transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (1917); SUAREZ, DE BELLO V, 7 (1621), transl. in VANDERPOL, LA DocTRINE ScHOLASTIQUE 349 (1919). Cf. generally, NYS, LES ORIGINES DU
DR01T INTERNATIONAL 140 et seq. (1894). Discrimination against Saracens, though to
a much lesser degree, is sometimes found with Protestant writers. See GENTILLI, DE
JuRE BELLI I, c. 12, p. 91 (1588), transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 56

(1933).
Grotius' reservation in respect to nations having no religion is purely academic.
DE JuRE BELLI AC PAcIS II, c. 20 § 46, translation in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAw 513 (1925).
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proach, Grotius gav:e his work a secular foundation. He rested the law
of nature upon a psychological fact, the "sociability" of men, and he
stressed the secular character of thi~ theory by the famous pronouncement that the theory would hold good "even if there is no Gqd or if
the affairs of men are of no concern to Him." 58 It is true the latter
phrase had been used before his time by scholastic writers, but to them it ·
served merely as an argumentative point in advocating an "indicative"
rather than a "preceptive" conception of the law of nature 54 ( which
means approximately that natural law, while offering a guidance, is
not binding in itself). Not only was this a minority view, explicitly
rejected by Suarez,55 but adoption of a nonreligious foundati_on of
the law of nature ~as very far from the minds of those scholastic
writers who had used that seemingly bold language.50 With Grotius,
the situation was different; he claimed in earnest that the law of nature and international law derived therefrom could subsist without a
divine foundation. This was an innovation of supreme importance. 57
Grotius was to mobilize for tq.e great cause of international law the
forces of faith as well as those of the dawning enlightenment.
Nevertheless, to Grotius personally the religious phase of his teachings was paramount. When enumerating the sanctions of the law of
118
GRoTius, DE JURE BELLI AC P Ac1s, "Prolegomena," ix ( l 62 5). See also id. I,
c. 1, IO, transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 38-40 (1925).
54
The writers and works are listed and the whole controversy is examined at
length by SUAREZ, LE LEGIBUS AC DEo LEGISLATORE II, 6, §§ 3 et seq. (in OPERA
OMNIA V). For a succinct discussion, cf. GIERKE, JoHANNES ALTHUs1us UND DIE
ENTWICKIELUNG DER NATURRDCHTLICHEN STAATSTHEORIEN, 4th ed. 73-75, notes 44,
45 (1929), quoting Suarez and Biel, infra note 56.
·
.
115
SUAREZ, LE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE II, 6, § 5 (in SUAREZ, OPERA
OMNIA V).
56
Thomas Aquinas established the doctrine that natural law is divine, being "the
rational creature's participation in the eternal law" which in turn is God's wisdom.
Cf. 9 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, "Law Natural," 76 et seq.; 9 D1cTIONNAIRE DE
THEOLOGIE CATHOLIQUE, "La Loi Naturelle," 878 et seq. (1926); WETZER &
WELTER, K1RcHENLEX1coN, "Naturrecht." In the latter authoritatively Catholic
work, Grotius' remarjc is "emphatically rejected." There is not the slightest reason to
assum\: that the scholastic writers mentioned above had anything in mind like Grotius'
secular theo!'}', Outstanding among them was Gabriel Biel (1425-1495). His works
are epitomized in 2 D1cTIONNAIRE DE THEOLOGIE CATHOLIQUE, "Biel," 814 et
seq. (1910). There the phrase in question is not even mentioned, but it is stated as
Biel's view that lying would be no sin should God abrogate the command not to lie.
(Lying was,to the scholastics a familiar instance of a violation of the law of nature).
117
This is not sufficiently recognized by Gurvitch, ~'La Philosophie du Droit de
Hugo Grotius et la theorie moderne du Droit international," 34 REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MoRALE 365 (1927); Gurvitch, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Soc1AL SCIENCES,
"Law of Nature." Remarkably, HEARNSHAW, TuDOR STUDIES 121, (1924), advances
the vie'\'\' that it is Bodin to whom Gr9tius owes his conception of the law of nature.
0
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nature and of nations, such as the righteous man's peace of conscience
or the power of public opinion ( the common judgment of decent men,
as he put it), he added: quad vero maximum: God is the righteous'
friend, the unrighteous' enemy. 58 In fact, Grotius' religious conviction,
of whose depth and strength his whole life bears testimony, 59 is the
main source of the enlivening warmth and spiritual force of his work.
It probably accounts for the high esteem in which Grotius' work was
held by Gustavus Adolphus, protagonist of Protestantism. As is well
known, Grotius, after the king's early death (r632), became Sweden's
ambassador to. France, probably in accord with the king's last intentions. 60 In a sense, Grotius was to Gustavus Adolphus what Suarez was
to Philip II.01
However, the Protestant version of the scholastic doctrine of just
war was not destined to last long. There is, among the more notable
post-Grotian writers only one, Samuel Rachel, a German Protestant
(r628-r69r), who was deeply concerned with the problem of just war
as well as with its religious implications. 62 While leaning heavily on
Grotius, Rachel did not conceive the issue of just causes of war as part
of international law. He assigned it-in contradistinction to the issues
of auctoritas principis and declaration of war-to "natural law," which,
according to him, was of divine origin and was rather a kind of religious
philosophy severed from the "law of nations." Rachel, therefore, banished the problem of the causes of just war from the province of the law.
SECULAR THEORIES OF THE

XVI, XVII,

AND

XVIII

CENTURIES

Alberico Gentili (r552-r608), Grotius' famous predecessor, had
moved much further away from the scholastics than did Grotius. Not
that he had withstood their influence altogether: the first of the three
books of his De Jure Belli 63 is dominated by the concept of just war,
:;s GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PAc1s, "Prolegomena" xi (1625), transl. in
Cuss1cs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1925).
59
Grotius "really lived a life of intense pre-occupation with the subject of religion." KNIGHT, THE LIFE AND WoRKS OF Huco GROTIUS 277 (1925).
60
See VREELAND, Huco GROTIUS 189 (1917); Basdevant, "Hugo Grotius,"
FoNDATEURS DU DRoIT INTERNATIONAL 125 at 145 (1904). The concatenation of
events is not sufficiently known since apparently the Swedish archives have not yet been
explored in respect to Grotius' appointment and ensuing activities.
61
See on the latter point I DE ScoRAILLE, FRANCOIS SuAREZ 335 (~913); 2 id.

17.
62
SAMUEL RACHEL, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM DISSERTATIONES (1676),
transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1916).
68
GENTILI, DE JuRE BELLI (1588), transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL.LAW

(1933).
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which he presents largely along traditional lines. He also considers the
law of nature as the basis of his conclusions and ascribes to it a divine
origin, but his observations on this subject are confused and perfunctory.6"' In reality, his discussion is very little colored by considerations
of a religious nature, and where they appear, they are by no means
forceful. No wonder that Gentili found no difficulty in admitting that a
war may be just on both sides; he even remarks that there may be
differences of degree of justness. Nor does Gentili dodge the grave
problem of the unrighteous victor. He offers-the reader the consolation
that "evyry wicked deed is its own punishment" and that "fear" ( of
what?) and loss of repute ( despite the victory?) are further chastisements.65 In conclusion he observes,66 "There is also Hell of which the
philosophers have taught us by the cogent truth ( ?eritate cogente) and
the theologians by the teaching truth ( veritate docente) ." 67 The sentence is not clear; probably it is caustic-an assumption which would
well agree with Gentili's literary manner. Be this as it may, his explanation is far from being satisfactory. Its inadequacy only illuminates
the weakness of Gentili's position regarding the whole issue of just war.
Another of Grotius' precursors, Balthasar Ayala (1548-1584),
auditor-general in the Spanish army fighting the Netherlands, took an
even more radical view in his De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina
Militari ( 15 82). 68 While generally leaning on the traditional doctrine
of natural law, he declared that his (scanty) remarks on just war bear
upon "equity and the duty of a virtuous man," rather than upon legal
effects.69 Hence, it is by a distinguished Spanish Catholic 10 that the
legal nature of the ju~t-war problem was first formally gainsaid.
Ayala's further remark that in wars between sovereigns it is ill-advised
'
VAN DER MoLEN, AL-.SERICO GENTILI 201 et seq. (1937).
65 GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI 1, c. 6, p. 52 (1588), transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1933).
ea Id.
67 The translation in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33, "There is also Hell of
which the philosophers have told us by induction, and the theologians from knowledge"
is definitely inaccurate.
68 AYALA, DE JURE ET OFFICIO BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI (1582),
transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1912).
69 Id. I, 2, §§ 1, 33. The original wording is "aequum et bonum ac viri boni
oflicium." It is true, in § 40 ibid Ayala asserts that a soldier's claim for pay .may be
defeated by the government on the ground that the war was not just, but apart from
Ayala's inconsistency this amazing theory only illustrates the aberrations of a legal
just-war doctrine.
70 SUAREZ, DE BELLO III, I 3, transl. in VANDERPOL, r,;._ DocTRINE ScHOLASTIQUE
404 (1919) cites Ayala in a distinctive way.
6 "'See
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to argue about the equity of the cause 71 is comprehensible from a servant
of Philip II, but of less general interest.
Among the post-Grotian followers of the natural law doctrine,
Pufendorf (1632-1694), the "son" of Grotius,72 has very little to say
in respect to the subject matter at hand. He was not particularly interested in the foreign aspects of the law of nature. Regarding just
war, he merely offers in his voluminous De Jure Naturae et Gentium
some unconnected supplementary comments on Grotius' discourse.78
In contrast to Pufendorf, Christian Wolff (1679-1756), another
follower of Grotius, was especially concerned with the international
aspects of the law of nature. Though with him the question of just
war is by no means as dominant as it is with the scholastics or with
Grotius, he gives it an elaborate treatment in his Jus Gentium Methodo
Scientifica Pertractatum (1749).14 Unfortunately, the understanding
of his doctrine is obstructed by a distinction peculiar to his system.
Aware of the fact that the traditional tenets derived from the law of
nature with regard to international relations differ too far from the exigencies of political common sense, Wolff split up the natural law part
of international law into a "necessary" and a "voluntary" law of nature. The "necessary" law follows from the law of nature in respect
to men and nations who are in the "state of nature" ( that is, in an
imaginary state of absolute liberty) ; it is addressed to their conscience.
The "voluntary" law however, is dictated by the needs and rules of
what Wolff calls the civitas gentium maxima, namely, the family of
civilized nations which Wolff represents as a kind of republic. This
voluntary law supersedes for all intents and purposes the "necessary"
law. Wolff's doctrine of just war well illustrates his distinction. Under
the head of "necessary" law of nature 75 Wolff, though omitting the
"judicial" theory of war, repeats the scholastic doctrine, inclusive of the
tenet that war can be just only on one side. From the viewpoint of
"voluntary" law, however,76-in order to avoid the rigor of the
necessary law of nature----he declares that war may be considered just
11 AYALA, DE JuRE ET OFFICIO BELLICIS ET DiscIPLINA MILITARI I, 2

(1582),
12

transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw,

PuFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM, Preface,

CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
18

74

Id.

VIII

c.

§ 33

p. 22 (1912).

(1688),

transl. in

p. VI.

6.

WoLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHono ScIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM
in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1934).

(1749),

transl.

75
Id. c. 6, §§ 617 ff., 633 ff., transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 314 ff.,
324 ff. (1934).
76
Id. c. 7, § 887, transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 453 ff. (1934).
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on both sides. To the latter statement he adds the Grotian qualifi!.
cation "as far as effects are concerned," but his argument goes to the
substance of the matter. His point is that, since no nation can assume
for it~eJf the functions of a judge and since each of the belligerents
claims to have a just cause of war, each nation must be allowed to follow its own opinion.77
Wolff's baroque and confusing 78 system spread over the world
through its incorporation in the Droit des Gens (1758) of Vattel,79
Wolff's admirer and follower. Being a practitioner of statecraft, Vattel,.
more than Wolff, was worried by the question of what unjustness
under "necessary" law actually means. Hence he devoted a special
·chapter to the "Sovereign who wages an unjust war." 80 He emphatically assured the reader that such an unrighteous sovereign has to
repair the evil done, or to give just satisfaction; that such a ruler must
even "submit t6 punishment, if that be necessary as an example, or
as an assurance, to the injured party or to human ~ociety, of his future
good conduct." 81 Nothing is said, however, as to how this educational
program shall operate in this world of ours. Instead, Vattel offers
adhortations and lamentations. Thus, he expatiates on the sovereign
who wages an unjust war, as follows:
"He is answerable for all the evils and all the disasters of the
war. The bloodshed, the desolation -of families, the pillaging, the
acts of violence, the devastation by fire and sword, are all his work
. and his crime. He is, guilty towards the enemy, whom he attacks,
oppresses, and massacres without cause; he is guilty towards his
people, whom he leads into acts of injustice, whom he exposes to
danger without necessity or reason-towards those of his subjects
77

Wolff's reasoning in this> matter is far from being cogent or consistent. The
distinction of "necessary" and "voluntary" law is neither clear in itself nor sufficiently
developed into its corollaries. See the able study of VoN KALTENBORN, KRITIK DER VoLKERRECHTS 68 et seq. ( I 847). For instance, in connection with the tenet that under
voluntary law war is just on both sides, Wolff asserts that the unrighteous only obtains
"immunity of punishment." This idea is borrowed from GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI
AC PAcis IV c. 4, §§ 3 and 4 (1625), transl. in ·CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
643-644 (1925), but in Wolff's entirely secular system of thought one does not see what
kind of "punishment" and "tribunal" is contemplated by the author. Regarding Grotius, cf. supra ns. 48 and 59.
78
It is confusing also for the reason that since Grotius' times the term "jus gentium
voluntarium," voluntary or volitional law of nations, has invariably been understood to
mean the customary and conventional law in contradistinction to the natural law phase
of international law.
79
VATTEL, DROIT DES GENS (1758).
80
Id. III, c. 11, transl. in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 302-303 (1916).
81
Id. III, c. Il, p. 133; transl. in CLASSICS 302.
'
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who are ruined or injured by the war, who lose their lives, their
property, or their health because of it; finally, he is guilty towards
all mankind, whose peace he disturbs and to whom he sets so pernicious an example. What a dreadful list of woes and crimes!
What an account to render to the King of Kings, to the common
Father of mankind! May this brief sketch give thought to the
rulers of Nations, to princes and their ministers. Why may we not
look for some fruit from it? Can those in high position have lost
all sense of honor, of humanity, of duty, and of religion?" 82
This empty phraseology which permeates Vattel's entire discussion
of the subject brings home the degeneration of the inherited doctrine,
as does his only original contribution to the mat~er, namely, the tenet
that a legal pretext on the part of the aggressor is preferable to the
frank confession of the absence of legal justification.88 Such degenera- ·
tion was bound to come as soon as the religious basis of the just-law
doctrine was abandoned.
THE Pos1T1v1sTs
Vattel was probably the last author of a comprehensive treatise on
the law of nations to give the problem of just war serious attention.
As has been seen, before him several representatives of the natural-law
school of thought had already_ pushed it aside. It goes without saying
that the "positivists"- being exclusively or preponderantly concerned
with actual international customs and treaties-showed little interest in
it. Bynkershoek ( 1673-1743), next to Grotius the foremost legal
mind among the early writers on international law, touched upon the
subject only in an insignificant manner.84 Johann Jacob Moser (17071785) called the question of just war "idle," 85 but it may be argued
82

Id. transl. in CLASSICS 302.
Id. Ill, c. 3, p. 25-26, transl. in CLASSICS 245.
84
BYNKERSHOEK, QuAESTIONES JURIS PuBLICI ( l 737), transl. in CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (1930) briefly points out that though the defense or recovery of
one's own is the only reason (ratio) of war, this is by no means the real goal (finis) of
war. War, he says subjects the whole realm of the vanquished sovereign to confiscation.
This statement contradicts the relevance of the just-cause doctrine in a particularly blunt
fashion which is characteristic of Bynkershock. He also definitely rejects the Grotian
infusion of the just-war conception into the theory of neutrality, id. I, c. 9, transl. in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 60 et seq. (1930).
Zouche, an early English positivist, contents himself with briefly reiterating the
Vitorian thesis; ZoucHE, JURIS ET Juoicn FEcIALIS SIVE JuRis INTER GENTES
EXPLICATIO II, c. 6, § 2 (1650), transl. CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW II2 (19II).
85
According to Lueder, in "Krieg und Kriegsrecht im Allgemeinen, 4 HoLTZENDORFF's HANDBUCH DES VoLKERRECHTS 227, n. 25 (1889). Regarding Moser, cf.
88
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that Moser had no patience with, and perhaps little understanding of,
l~gal theory. More important is the attitude of G. F. van Martens, the.
author of the Precis du Droit des Gens de l'Europe (1789), 86 the first
modern system of international law. Though recognizing the law of
nature as a subsidiary source, van Martens does not give the doctrine of
just war more than the honor of mention. He points out that war, if
not "manifestly unjust," is actually being considered by both parties as
lawful in respect to the treatment of the enemy and the validity of conventions and treaties. 87 This statement, reminiscent of Grotian tenets,88
has thenceforth never been questioned, except that the qualification
regarding "manifest unjustness" has been abandoned. This evolution
amounts to a universal recognition of the legal irrelevance of the justwar conception, especially if one adds the well-settled elimination of
the latter from the law of neutrality.89
There have been in the nineteenth and in the twentieth century
writers who, in a routine way, incidentally refer to the doctrine of just
war as a valid one. These writers generally do not give real thought
to the subject, particularly do they not posit the question of how far
the legal effects of a just war differ from those of an unjust war. An
outstanding representative of this group is Phillimore who showed so
little concern about the issue of just war that he placed it in the chapter
on embargo.00 Bonfils-Fauchille 91 declared first that "a war is neither
just nor unjust in itself or regarding its effect," but then they added
.that "the jurist" (in contradistinction, it seems, to the "politician" and
"statesman") "must stigmatize and condemn wars of ambition and conquest,"-a loosely worded qualification which apparently contrasts an
opportunistic stand with a stand based on principle. Calvo 92 gave an
account of the views of earlier writers on the various kinds of war,
without contribution of his own. Still less satisfactory from a legal
WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW-OF NATIONS 322 et seq. (1845); CARL BECHER,
JOHANN JACOB MOSER UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG FUR DAS VoLKERRECHT (1927).
86
.
C. ·F. VoN MARTENS, PRECIS DU DROIT DES GENS DE L'EuROPE (1789)
(translated by CoBBETr, CoMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (1802).
87
Id. VIII, c. 2, § 3.
- 88 Supra p. 464.
89
See 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th (Lauterpacht) ed., §§ 293 ff.

(1935).
00

.

PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3rd ed., 54

ff.

(1885).
91

BoNFILs-FAucHILLE, MANUEL DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, 7th ed.,.

719, 720 (1914-).
92
4 CALvo, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE, 5th ect., 3 I fl..
(1896) •.
I
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viewpoint is the half-moralist, half-theological account of the causes of
war by Halleck 93 who was a high army officer. Bluntschli, on the other
hand, made a fresh scientific effort by offering a new definition of the
just causes of war,9 4 but he stretched them to such an extent as to give
almost any war the blessing of the law of nations.95 No other writer
has followed him.
The great majority of the modern leading writers do not consider
the doctrine of just war to be a part of international law. Some of them,
for instance Frederick de Martens,96 Merignhac,97 and Wheaton 98 do
not mention it in their systematic treatises; others like Diena,99 Fenwick,100 Hall,101 Heffter,102 Lawrence,1°3 von Liszt,1°4 Louter,105 Nysthe learned historian of international law,106-Oppenheim,101 Pillet,108
and Westlake 109 do proffer reasons for their negative attitude. Rightly
they place the emphasis upon the absence of differences in the legal
effects of just or unjust wars, respectively, upon the crucial vagueness
93

HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 311-326 (1861).
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CoDIFIE, 5th ed., §§ 515-518 pp
293-294 (1895).
95 Among the just causes of war Bluntsshli counts "obstacles raised to the formation or development of a new right''; id. 294.
96 FREDERICK DE MARTENS, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, transl. Leo.
(1883).
97 MERIGNHAc, TRAITE DE DRoIT PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL (1912). In vol. 3, pt.
1, p. 10, the author remarks that one should not resort to war except in the case of an
inescapable necessity and after all attempts of mediation have failed. This view, which
is also expressed by a few other writers, does not suggest adoption of the traditional
"just-war" doctrine, and it is apparently moral and political in character.
98 WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Dana's ed., (1866), reproduced in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1936).
99 DIENA, DmITTO INTERNAZIONALE PuBLico, 3rd ed., 590 (1930); regardillJ!"
the exceptions maintained by this author, see infra n. 135.
10° FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2nd ed., 442 (1934).
101 HALL, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed., 60, ·61 (1909).
102 HEFFTER, DAS EUROPAISCHE VoLKERRECHT DER GEGENWART, 8th ed.,
239 (1888).
103 LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 7th (Winfield) ed.,
311 (1923).
104 VoN LISZT, DAs VoLKERRECHT, 12th (Fleischmann) ed., §56 p. 445 (1925)
105 2 LouTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PosITIF 223 (1920).
106 3 NYs, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL·8 (1912).
107 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4th ed., § 63 (1926). 2 id. 5th
(Lauterpacht) ed., §§ 63, 64 (1935) refers to the Covenant of the League of Nations
and to the Kellogg Pact as involving the just-war conception. On this, see infra p. 477.
108 PILLET, LES CoNVENTIONs DE LA HAYE 3 ( 191 8) .
109 2 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2nd ed., 4 (1913).

94 BLUNTSCHLI,
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of the whole conception, and upon the nonexistence of a competent
tribunal. 110 •
A remnant of the old doctrine may be found in the elaboration by a
treatise writer of a "procedural" part of internationai law, which, in
addition to arbitration and perhaps to other topics, deals with the law
of war.111 The "judicial theory" of war, albeit unconsciously, is behind
such an organization_ of international law.
ATTEMPTS AT RESUSCITATING THE JusT-WAR DocTRINE

As appears from earlier parts of the present article, there have been
published since the First World War and particularly within the last
decade a great many studies by Catholic theologians and other writers
interested in the international aspects of the scholastic doctrine.112 Inasmuch as in past times the writings of Vitoria and Suarez had sometimes been overlooked in the historical discussion of international law,113
the reaction against such forgetfulness is sound. The emphasis upon
the scholastic doctrine also brings home, in an era of barbarism, the age
and strength of the Church's tradition of humaneness in international
relations. But it would be in vain to look at it as a possible source of
the regeneration of international law. In addition to the general
objections to the just-war doctrine, it~ scholastic version is too deeply
rooted in the medieval religious conception of a moral universe, and
depends too much upon dogmatic premises.114 For similar reasons, it
110
Perhaps the most comprehensive refutation, of the just-war conception as a legal
doctrine is offered by Lueder, "Krieg und Kriegsrecht im Allgemeinen," 4 HoLTZENDORFF's HANDBUCH DES VoLKERRECHTS, § 57 (1889). Lueder's discussion suffers,
· however, from the infusion of arguments which smack of enthusiasm for war. Remarkably, also the historical inquiry by SALVIOLI, LE CoNcEPT DE LA GUERRE JusTE
(1918), supra note 1, leads to the rejection of the just-war doctrine.
111 This type of systematization was first employed by WoLFF; Jus GENTIUM
METHODO ScIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM (1749); see particularly id. c. 5, transl. in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 288 ff (1934).
Among the later writers the procedural theory was resorted to by Diena, Fauchille,
Fenwick, Frederick de Martens, and others. See also VoN KALTENBORN, KRITIK DFt
VoLKERRECH-T, 278 (18.47).
112
Supra, ns. 7, 9, 15, 23, 35.
118 The study of Von Kaltenborn, who in a sense may be called the ·first historian
of international law, is· a particularly striking example. As a matter of fact, he considered the law of nations as a "Protestant science." See VoN KALTENBORN, KRITIK
DES VoLKERRECHTS 24 (1847). In his later work, Drn VoRLAUFER DES Huco
GROTIUS AUF DEM GEBIETE DES Jus NATURAE ET GENTIUM 136-142 (1848), he
discusses Suarez' discourse on war.
114 This has frequently been pointed out, e.g., 2 WRIGHT, STUDY OF WAR 886
(1942); BALLADORE-PALLIERI, LA GUERRA 46 in 3 TRATTATo m D1R1TTO INTER-
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would be impossible to build up a legal doctrine of just war upon particular Protestant ethics.115 Not only are religious tenets, whatever they
be, unacceptable as a basis for the law of the international community
of today or tomorrow, but any approach originating in a moral philosophy for individuals is bound to prove inadequate in the regulation of
international relations.
No wonder that modern attempts made at secularizing and modernizing the old doctrine have failed; they have only shown that it
fades entirely as soon as it is severed from its fostering soil, religion. 116
A century ago another just-war notion had appeared in the Hegelian philosophy, but it was different in character. According to
Hegel, the W eltgeist manifests itself through history, which Hegel
considers as the embodiment of reason.117 The outcome of historical
struggles, therefore, reveals ex post facto which nation was right in the
philosophical sense. Like St. Augustine, Hegel is not concerned with the
military decision of a war in itself, momentous though it be, but with
historical evolution in its broader aspects and hence with developments
which, by their very indefiniteness if not for other reasons, escape the
application of juristic methods.118 Nevertheless, there is a forgotten
. German author who tried to infiltrate Hegelian philosophy in his
NAZIONALE (1935); Wegner, "Ober gerchte und ungerechte Kriege," 5 ZEITSCHRIFI'
FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 528 ff. (1926).
llG There exists something like that in LoRIMER, INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS (1883) where a doctrine of "jural war" is developed, centering on the
assertion and defense of freedom; I id. 19 et seq. Lorimer's religious approach appears
more distinctly in his THE INSTITUTES oF LAw: A TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
JURISPRUDENCE AS DETERMINED BY NATURAL LAw, 2nd ed., (1880). On Lorimer see
Rolin-Jacquemins, "Les principes philosophiques du droit international," 17 REv. DE
DR. INT. 517 (1885); 18 id. 49 (1886), and Felix Cohen, "Lorimer," ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF Soc1AL SCIENCES.
116
This is particularly true of STRISOWER, DER KRIEG UND DIE VoLKERRECHTSORDNUNG ( I 9 I 9) where moralizing views are unconvincingly represented as legal. In
LE FuR, GuERRE JusTE ET JusTE PAIX (preface by Maurice Barres) (19zo) an
attempt is made at utilizing the just-war conception for a passionate vindication of the
Treaty of Versailles, from the French political point of view. Contra: CuTEN, LA
NoTION DE GUERRE PERMISE (thesis Paris) 73 (1931).
117
HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS, §§ 330 et seq., 341,
et seq. (1921). Cf. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 620 ff., 629 ff.
(1937); Routh, "The Philosophy of International Relations: T. H. Green v. Hegel,"
3 PoLITICA 223 (1938).
118
The notion that victory in war is the test of right in international relations is
characteristically found in an advocate of a cynical "right-is-might" philosophy;
E. KAuFMANN, DAS WEsEN DEs VoLKERREcHTS UND DIE CLAusuLA REBus Sic
STANTIBUS 153 (1911). See KELSEN, DAs PROBLEM DER SouvERANITAT UND DAS
WESEN DER VoLKERRECHTS 265, note 3, (1920).
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System of the Law of Nations, 119 and Heffter-in the nineteenth century the most successful writer in the field-declared, in unmistakable
Hegelian phraseology, that history is the ultimate sanction of international law.120 The fact, however, that in his· chapter on war Heffter
treats the question of the cause of war as legally irrelevant 121 indicates
that his Hegelian remarks are merely philosophical ornaments on a
juridical structure.
Kelsen is almost the only 122 writer who-in a recent American
publication 123-has tried to reconstruct the notion of just war on juridical grounds. Kelsen is known to have been a prominent advocate of
the supremacy of international law in the order of the universe.124 In
his recent publication he does not recur to this idea, but he tries to
ascribe to the law of nations at least.equality with other branches of the
law by insisting upon its direct enforceability, which, he believes, consists in the possibility of the recourse to war. In this connection, Kelsen
employs a new legal argument. Starting from the assumption that
reprisals are generally recognized as "sanctions" of international law,
he claims as a cogent corollary the same character for "unlimited reprisals," war. However, reprisals, in contradistinction to wars, require
per definitionem the allegation of a vioJated right; they are therefore
necessarily tied up to the law. Reprisals have been arbitrated, but wars
have not.125 On the other hand, one may also doubt whether the effects
of reprisals intrinsically depend on law rather than on might.
QUALIFYING THE REJECTION OF THE JusT-WAR DOCTRINE

Only from a legal viewpoint is the concept of just war unavailing.
In ethics, religion, philosophy, history, politics, the situation is different, and condemnation of a specific war will frequently be imperative.
119

H. B. OPPENHEIM, SYSTEM DES Vi:iLKERRECHTS (1845). This is not the
same Oppenheim that wrote the famous English treatise. Cf. the critical remarks by
VoN KALTENBORN, KRITIK DES VoLKERRECHTs 154, 220 et seq. (1847).
120
HEFFTER, DAS EuROPEAISCHE VoLKERRECHT DER GEGENWART, 8th ed., 3
(1888).
121 Id. § 113.
122
Regarding Pradier-Fodere see infra. n. 13 2.
123
KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 52 ff. (1942).
124
See par,ticularly KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOVVERANITAT UND DAS WESEN
DES VoLKERRECHTS ( 1920) ; Kunz, "The 'Vienna School' and International Law,"
11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 370 (1934); Jones, "The 'Pure' Theory of International
Law," B. Y. B. INT. L. 5 (1935); Stern, "Kelsen's Theory of International Law," 30
AM. PoL. Sex. REv. 736 (1936).
125
As in the case of the Naulilaa, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw CASES, edited by McNair and Lauderpacht, Case No. 360, (1927-1928).
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In this connection, violations of international law may be an important
incidental factor, though at least in the fields of ethics and religion it is
more the violations of humaneness or of good faith than of the law
that stir the mind.
In the province of law itself, rejecting the just-war doctrine is not
tantamount to recognizing a "right" of states to start a war. In no way
does international law impart any consent or approval to belligerency.
In this respect it does not matter whether or not the attacked nation has
actually violated the law. Even from a moralistic point of view, such a
violation might not offer a sufficient justification when the horrors of
war would be disproportionate to the violation of the law-which is
another reason why war as such cannot be an adequate means of enforcing international law. The "outbreak" of a war is a metajuristic 126
phenomenon, an event outside the range and control of the law. Its
legal significance consists merely in the fact that the status of the
belligerents and, to a certain extent, the status of third powers is
changed: the international law of peace is displaced by the international
law of war.
Nevertheless, it should not be denied that in special situations the
idea of just war might acquire legal significance. It may happen that a
treaty or other international agreement avails itself of the just-war concept.121 The outstanding example is the Covenant of the League of
Nations,128 inasmuch as the covenant, under certain conditions, reserved
to the members of the league "the right to take such action as they
shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice."
Again, the Kellogg Pact banishes war as an instrumentality of national
policies. The pact does not necessarily imply, as has been asserted,129 the
rule of just war; in fact, it rejects war on general terms.180 And in no
126 This term has been used similarly by VoN LISZT, DAs VoLKERRECHT 12th
(Fleischmann) ed., 446 (1925).
121 It underlies the much discussed Article 2 31 of the Treaty of Versailles which
imposed upon Germany the responsibility for the First World War. But this was a
judgment on past history rather than an agreement on future conduct.
Von Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law,"
33 AM. J. INT. L. 665 at 670, note 35, (1939), draws attention to the Augsburg Confession of the Protestant German Princes, Art. XVI (1530), where the declarants claim
the right to wage just wars (rechte kriege), to wit, independently from the emperor.
The use of the old theological device was natural in a declaration of religious import.
Cf. H. E. JAcoBs, Boox OF CoNCORD 41 (1912).
128 Art. 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; I L. N. 0. J. 7 (1920).
129
KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 39 (1942).
1110
While condemning "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies," and renouncing it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with
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case has the Kellogg Pact adopted the moralistic theory of just war.
Nor should such a theory be read into the Covenant of the League of
Nations.
,Bynkershoek 131 and other writers 132 have advanced the opinion that
alliances are to be interpreted in the light of the just-war theory so as to
authorize an allied power to question the casus f oederis on the ground
that the war is unjust. Where, however, the casus foederis is actually
present, such an excuse w~uld constitute a gross violation of good faith.
In the long history of broken alliances there seems to be no instance.
of a use of this pretext.138 And, as has been pointed o~t above,134 writers
are agreed today that the doctrine of just war has no place in ·the law
of neutrality.185
CONCLUSION

In retrospect it appears that the traditional doctrine of just war is
essentially religious; where its religious spirit evaporates, only a shallow and stale residue remains. Certainly, the issue of just war deserves
discussion in any course or textbook on international law, but only as a
matter of analysis and historical information. This view will eliminate
a prolific source of doubts and obscurities. The just-war-on-both-sides
problem is illustrative. It is there that insoluble troubles befell the
writers who tried to elaborate the just-war concept in a legal or semil~gal way. Vitoria attempted to reconcile theory and practice by conferring the term of "just" upon an unjust cause provided the party
acted bona fide; Suarez bolstered this ~enet by an application of the
each other, the signatory powers proclaim that "the settlement or solution· of all disputes
or conflicts ••• which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific
means." TREATY SERIES No. 796.
1111
BYNKERSHOEK, QuAESTIONES JURIS PUBLICI, I, c. 9 (1737), transl. in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 et seq. (1930).
132 E.g., without reference to Bynkershoek: 6 PRADIER-Foi>ERE, TRAITE DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC § 2666, p. 581, 582 (1894). On the ground of this
tenet and of the Grotian neutrality doctrine, supra note 48, Pradier-Fodere declares for the just-war concept. He admits, however, that his instances go to "theoretical" rather than to "actual" (reel) international law.
138
In the English-Danish alliance of 1621, cited by STRISOWER, DER KRIEG UND
DIE VoLKERRECHTSORDNUNG 53, n. 17 (1919), the exception of .unjust cause was explicitly reserved, however. Evidently, this was a precarious alliance. The exception of
unjust war was waived in the French-Brandenburg alliance of 1681, likewise cited by
Strisower.
'
134
·
Supra n. 89.
lSG DIENA, DIR1TT0 INTERNAZIONALE PuBLicco, 3rd ed., 590 (1930) offers some
other instances of a legal significance of the just war doctrine, but they are imaginary
and unconvincing.
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doctrine of probabilism; Grotius shirked the problem by another improper terminology; and Wolff presented opposite tenets in the
"necessary" and the "voluntary" law of nations. In reality, from the
viewpoint of legal science, we are confronted with a typical sham-problem which arises from a wrong approach---an approach which presupposes the very applicability of legal characteristics to the causes of war
and thereby begs the problem.
The whole conception of international law differs according to
whether the notion of just war will or will not be accepted. If not, as
was pointed out, war can no longer be considered as a means of enforcing an international right. This means, indeed, the admission that international law cannot, or cannot effectively, be enforced. From this
premise it does not necessarily follow that international law is not a
real law. Frequently, it has been maintained by the philosophers of law
that enforceability is not a criterion of law, and some writers believe
that the pressure of public opinion is a sufficient means of enforcement.
But if it be law, it remains a fragment. This fact is not sufficiently reflected by prevalent doctrines and ideologies which, in the field of grand
political strategy may have and have had disastrous effects. 186 It is not
enough to reject the jural validity of the notion of "just war"; the
truth seems to be that the law of nations does not cover a crucial part of
international developments. An attempt to define those limitations of
the law of nations would, of course, far exceed the scope of a study like
this. But the belief may be expressed that the formidable political
potentialities resulting from the very fragmentariness of the law of
nations must not be left to the exclusive use of those forces which are
bent on conquest, suppression, and enslavement.
186
In this respect VAN KLEFFENS, (Dutch Prime Minister) JUGGERNAUT OVER
HoLLAND (1941) gives much stuff for thought.

